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Aldous Huxley: Brave New
World (The Easton Press, 1978) Why is it that, lurking behind the superior existence
hinted at by all these clever English satirists, is some kind of High Church
Anglicanism with its robust appeal to tradition and sentimental
obscurantism? In Huxley’s case High Churchism is tinged by a titillating
flirtation with popery and a stout adherence to the bourgeois (What other
word really fits?) religion of High Art, sexual repression, true and deep
emotion and edifying discourse as a substitute for philosophical rigor.
Huxley never exhibits the slightest intimation that the way of life he
advocates should be found anything but risible or repulsive to anyone
besides himself and his Surrey croquet circle.
And risible it is. I personally find many aspects of
Huxley’s anti-utopia to be deeply attractive, particularly the sexual
freedom (One man’s promiscuity is another’s freedom) and the dedication to
personal physical attractiveness. Other items are at least open to
controversy. Soma was not replaced by Huxley’s beloved LSD but by the not
entirely to be despised Prozac and its sister drugs. Equally, the fault in
the feely and environmental kitsch of Brave New World lies not in the
advanced artistic techniques which in many instances have been put to
brilliant use by the avant-garde but in other factors that produce bad art
today and produced what may have been bad art in Shakespeare’s time (Were
Jonson’s masques all on a par with King Lear or were some or most of
them simply technologically primitive feelies?) Indeed the only art Huxley
admits into his pantheon, namely lyric and tragic poetry, appears to have
gone the way of the Dodo, today surviving for better or worse only in the
hands of a few clit deprived spinsters and various CUNY sinecures. Finally,
as we have not without some justification been drilled to believe by
innumerable right wing economists, a consumer society is not at all a bad
thing. Consumption fuels production, which in turn provides a living for
those who otherwise might still be trying to coax nourishment from a few
mealy potatoes. Consumerism is equally good, because through innovation and
the demands of good taste, it urges improvement in the consumer product.
Benighted Starbuck’s serves an array of products far superior to the weak
tea and chicory of presumably more authentic times past.
Certainly there are faults in Brave New World’s
utopia. Condemning certain classes of humans to biological
underdevelopment is truly unpleasant. Most people can achieve this state on
their own and do not need prenatal chemical support. The caste system that
results from this biological tampering, in fact any class system, never
looks good simply because no class system ever is good. Leave it to an
Englishman to make a class system, for better or for worse, part and parcel
of his ruminations on society. Huxley’s intellectual universe is infected
with that other English disease. He simply cannot imagine any world, Utopian
or anti-Utopian, which is not structured in one way or another along class
lines. One might almost say that class distinction is the core concept
behind the specifically English sense of community.
It is not the case, however, that sexual freedom and
artistic and technological innovation are in any way inextricable from the
drawbacks of Huxley’s anti-utopia. Why not a technologically advanced
society where alphas and epsilons can happily fuck away to the sounds of
pre-recorded Bartok or artistically superior trance music? Huxley is no
greater a fool than when he assumes that sexual freedom is a sure sign of
bad, bad people. He is really no more than a Victorian pansy clucking in
disapproval at the very notion of heterosexual sexuality as pleasure
untarnished by the family-friendly religion of True Love. Yet at the same
time he masturbates over a purely conjured, utterly Chateaubriand vision of
a more genuine, more true primitive society much to be prized over modern
secularism and utilitarianism and populated almost exclusively by the
homosexually titillating hallucination of naked Navajo bodies.
The sexual utopia has not gone all the way to resolving
a fault that, as in the case of Bernard Marx, can lead to widening ripples
of discontent (Bernard and Lenina are unexpectedly the most psychologically
complex characters in the book). The fault is rejection by someone you
desire, the inability to have sexual relations with any partner you choose.
One suspects the humiliating experience of rejection lies behind the
fanaticism of any number of anti-sex crusaders. Recognizing this as a
serious problem, however, is not a reason for the wholesale rejection of
sexual freedom. It is, rather, something that we should address ourselves to
resolve.
The conditioning through pre-recorded suggestion and
techniques of association is, as depicted, equally unpalatable. The broader
issue, however, is not unreservedly black and white. Skinner makes a case at
least worthy for discussion of a type of non-coercive behavioral
conditioning. And why is conditioning wrong only because it instills or
reinforces ideas we disapprove? Conditioning is a permanent fact of life in
society. It begins in civics class and continues through filtered exposure
to the news, through the media and the arts, whether or not those
institutions are state controlled or simply controlled by the coercion of
the marketplace.
Random Thoughts:
Huxley, one may observe, is partially replaying the
archaic struggle between Ancients and Moderns. But his ancients include
Shakespeare and such intellectual pygmies as Cardinal Newman and Maine de
Biran while the moderns seem to consist of elevator music, free sex and
motor cars.
Huxley’s hostility to the fruits of technology puts him
into uncomfortable fellowship with his sure-to-be Luddite nemeses. Curiously
machine smashing is an indigenously English trait that unites socialists and
Huxleyan conservatives. One cannot attribute this psychological quirk solely
to the fact that the industrial Revolution came to England first since other
societies have had plenty of time to nurture their own home grown Ludditism
without much success.
The smug ideology of Anglicanism gave intellectual
cover to a ruthless and brutal empire, an institution whose most significant
result was to bring immense suffering to an immense part of humanity. It did
not seem to occur to the Coleridges, the Arnolds and the Huxleys that they
could play their rural communal games only because the huge apparatus of the
British Empire gave them the wherewithal to do so, that is only because
their society thrived on the backs of so many Indians, Irish, Africans or
Chinese. Jonathan Swift, to his credit, saw this coming but from his early
Cassandra-ish standpoint he had neither the experience nor the intellectual
apparatus to see how his own Anglican Christianity would acquiesce to
providing a theology for conquest, good reasons for exploitation.
Huxley’s Preface has a comment worth noting and
amending. He says that as of his time there remained no true Conservatives.
One might add that then and now there are also no true Liberals. There are
only nationalistic radicals of the Right and nationalistic radicals of the
Left. This should be a tip off that there is something wrong with politics
and something wrong with the concept of a nation.
Huxley, or rather Mustapha Mond percipiently notes a
phenomenon that has not received a great deal of attention right, left or
center. He notes that after a certain point, reducing the workweek results
in negative and not positive effects. Given too much free time people
experience frustration not opportunity. The anticipated flood of Picassos
and Rimbauds fails to materialize. Work, as many retirees have attested, is
preferable to leisure. I remain unsure whether this is bad or good. I remain
unsure whether it is a matter of conditioning or whether that is just the
way some people are. It requires more thought. I am sure that the true
Übermensch should seek as much as possible to liberate himself from the
sort of work that interferes with or does not contribute to imaginative and
intellectual pleasure or that serves no more than to sustain life.
The savage believed that by resorting to the simple
life, the life of growing his own food and making his own tools, he would be
free. And indeed he did free himself in some sense from the society that
surrounded him. But he freed himself only to fall victim to another slavery,
the slavery of his needs and his sustenance, the time consuming drudgery of
eating and surviving that social and economic innovation was designed to
reduce or eliminate. To be satisfied with the Savage’s alternative existence
one would have to hold firmly to an ideology that a life in close contact
with barely modified nature and devoted almost entirely to subsistence
agriculture is a supreme end in itself and that its values far outweigh the
values to be had from extended leisure. I for one remain unattracted by the
life of a bearded mountain man. Does this mean we must submit ourselves
without qualification to whatever society we are thrown into? Philosophers
from Hobbes forward have assured us we must submit. But maybe not. (To be
continued.)
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